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Abstract
The aim of the current study was to examine neural signatures of gaining money for self and charity in adolescence.
Participants (N=160, aged 11–21) underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging-scanning while performing a
zero-sum vicarious reward task in which they could either earn money for themselves at the expense of charity, for a
self-chosen charity at the expense of themselves, or for both parties. Afterwards, they could donate money to charity, which
we used as a behavioral index of giving. Gaining for self and for both parties resulted in activity in the ventral striatum
(specifically in the NAcc), but not gaining for charity. Interestingly, striatal activity when gaining for charity was positively
related to individual differences in donation behavior and perspective taking. Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula and
precentral gyrus were active when gaining only for self, and temporal-parietal junction when gaining only for charity,
relative to gaining for both parties (i.e. under equity deviation). Taken together, these findings show that striatal activity
during vicarious gaining for charity depends on levels of perspective taking and predicts future acts of giving to charity.
These findings provide insight in the individual differences in the subjective value of prosocial outcomes.
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Introduction
Adolescence is a transitional period between childhood and
adulthood, ranging approximately from 10 to 22 years (Crone
and Dahl, 2012). This period is characterized by elevated reward
sensitivity (Silverman et al., 2015), sensation seeking and a drive
to obtain rewards (Steinberg, 2008; Hauser et al., 2015). In addi-
tion, a shift takes place from adolescents spending more time
outsides the family context, towards spending more time with
their peers, resulting in an increasing influence of the peer group
on adolescents’ behavior (Steinberg, 2001). Related to this social
shift, adolescents develop prosocial goals and social-perspective
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taking skills to improve (Eisenberg et al., 1995, 2006). These social
transitions occur in parallel with an increasing need of ado-
lescents to contribute to society and to develop prosocial goals
(Fuligni, 2018). One way to gain more insight into these prosocial
motivations is by studying neural activity during prosocial out-
comes (e.g. rewards gained for others). In the current study, we
examined neural responses to prosocial rewards for charity and
how this relates to giving behavior towards charities.
Neuroscientific studies in adults have demonstrated that
anticipating rewards (Knutson and Greer, 2008) and gaining
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/scan/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/scan/nsaa027/5803446 by Erasm
us U
niversiteit R
otterdam
 user on 06 M
ay 2020
2 Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2020, Vol. 00, No. 00
rewards for oneself is associated with activity in the ventral
striatum, specifically in the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) (Delgado,
2007) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Montague and Berns, 2002;
Moll et al., 2006; Berridge and Kringelbach, 2015). Additionally,
activity in NAcc correlates with subjective stimulus value (Bartra
et al.,2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).Activity in theNAcc during
reward processing is especially strong in adolescence compared
to childhood and adulthood (Galvan et al., 2006; Silverman et al.,
2015). This adolescent-specific striatial hyperactivity has been
related to negative behavioral outcomes, such as increases in
risk-taking behavior (Galvan et al., 2007) and increased alcohol
consumption (Braams et al., 2016). Interestingly, whereas early
studies have typically related the increase in striatal activity
to negative outcomes such as risk-taking (Galvan et al., 2007),
more recently studies have nuanced this view by showing
associations between increased striatal activity and giving to
family in adolescence (Telzer et al., 2013). These findings suggest
that whereas adolescence has previously been viewed as a
period of risk for negative developmental outcomes, it is possible
that adolescence additionally provides rich opportunities for
prosocial development (Fuligni, 2018).
An increasing body of evidence shows a parallel between
neural activation for self- and other-gains (referred to as vicar-
ious gains). That is, in several studies, vicarious gains were
associated with similar NAcc activation as when gaining for self
in adults (Morelli et al., 2018; Spaans et al., 2018) and adolescents
(Braams andCrone, 2017).Moreover, stronger activitywhen gain-
ing for friends was associated with everyday prosocial actions
in adults (Morelli et al., 2018). Whereas vicarious reward-related
activity in the NAcc has been found primarily for vicarious gains
for close others, such as family members and friends (Braams
et al., 2014b; Braams and Crone, 2017; Morelli et al., 2018), it is
not consistently found in all studies (Morelli et al., 2015). Prior
research suggested that ventral striatal activity for vicarious
gains is dependent on individual differences in willingness to
give to others (Kuss et al., 2013), perceived importance of the ben-
eficiary (Telzer et al., 2013; Braams et al., 2014b) and trait empa-
thy (Spaans et al., 2018). Research in adults has demonstrated
that the NAcc is involved in gains for charities, which reflects
more distal targets (Harbaugh et al., 2007; Genevsky et al., 2013),
but it is not yet known how reward-related activity for charity
emerges during adolescence.Weaimed to explore the processing
of these vicarious rewards specifically in adolescence, given its
importance as a period of social reorientation (Nelson et al.,
2005).
In short, the current study examined neural responses
when gaining for self and charity. Previous studies on vicarious
rewards used gambling tasks with two outcomes, gains or losses,
which preclude the possibility to clearly distinguish between
self-loss and other-gain. In the current design, we used a zero-
sum false-choice task with a prisoner-dilemma-inspired pay-off
scheme, where outcomes could be beneficial to self only, charity
only or both parties, relative to a no-gain baseline (previously
validated in adults, see Spaans et al., 2018). Given the zero-sum
nature of the task, gains for self were always accompanied by
no-gains for charity, and vice versa.We decided on using a false-
choice task with the aim to decompose the processes (Tamir and
Hughes, 2018) underlying vicarious gaining, explicitly focusing
on the neural reactions to viewing outcomes for self and charity,
and to separate them from decision-making-related activation.
Furthermore, we varied the size of the possible outcomes in
the task to dissociate absolute and relative amounts of gain
(Tabibnia et al., 2008). Based on the literature that suggests
that personal gain and vicarious gain have a common neural
substrate, we predicted that self-gain, both-gain and charity-
gain would all result in activity in the NAcc. Second, based on
prior studies showing that closeness to the target might affect
whether or not vicarious gains are associated with activity in
the NAcc (Telzer et al., 2013; Braams et al., 2014a), we expected
charity-gain-related responses to be dependent on self-reported
closeness to and perceived importance of the charity. Finally,
we addressed the question whether neural responses during
vicarious gains predicted individual differences in self-reported
perspective-taking, empathy (Spaans et al.,2018) and prosociality
as measured by actual donating behavior (Genevsky et al., 2013;
Morelli et al., 2018).
Methods
Participants and procedure
A total of 160 participants between the ages of 11 and 21 partici-
pated in this study (84 females,M=15.99 years, s.d.= 2.95). Three
participants were excluded from functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) analyses, two of whom were excluded due to
movement during fMRI (>3mm) and one due to signal dropout in
the SPM mask including the ventral striatum (this was assessed
by visual inspection of all individual SPM masks). The final
analyzed fMRI sample consisted of 157 adolescents. All analyses
on behavioral datawere conductedwith the full sample (N=160).
All participants (and their parents if younger than 18) gave
written informed consent. All participants were right-handed
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were
screened with questionnaires on three separate occasions (once
by phone-call, once by e-mail and once on the testing-day) for
MRI contra-indications and for (history of) neurological and/or
psychiatric disorders. All anatomical MRI scans were reviewed
by a radiologist. No anomalous findings were reported. The
study and all of its procedures were approved by the ethical
commission board of the Leiden University Medical Center.
Materials
COSY fMRI-task. To investigate responses to vicarious gains for
charity, we used a false-choice fMRI-task called the charity or
self-yield (COSY) task, which we used in an earlier study with
a separate adult sample (Spaans et al., 2018). In the COSY task,
participants can earn money for themselves and for a previ-
ously self-chosen charity (see Supplementary File A for the list
of charities) by deciding which out of two curtains to open
on every trial. After participants press a button, an onscreen
hand indicates what option they have selected. Next, the chosen
curtain opens in a fluid animation (14 frames presented for
50 ms each), with the outcomes fully visible from the seventh
frame onwards. The outcomes were either a division of 4 Euro
stakes between parties, or a division of 2 Euro stakes between
parties. All outcomes were zero-sum, with gains for one party
being inversely related to gains of the other party. Specifically,
in case of a division of 4 Euros (high magnitude), this could
result in the following outcomes: self high [e4 self, e0 charity];
charity high [e0 self, e4 charity] or both high [both e2]. In case
of a division of 2 Euros (low magnitude), this could result in the
following outcomes: self low [e2 self, e0 charity]; charity low
[e0 self, e2 charity: charity low] or both low [both e1]. In both
conditions, these outcomes were contrasted against a zero gain
baseline both no gain [both e0]. The two stakes were used to
control for magnitude when examining the effects of mutual
gain (Tabibnia et al., 2008). A black jitter screen (0–8800 ms) was
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the basic trial flow of the zero-sum COSY task. At trial onset, a black screen was presented with a jittered duration between 0 and 8800 ms.
Subsequently, a fixation cross was shown for 500 ms, followed by the response selection screen for 2000 ms. After a response was made, an animation was shown
onscreen for the remainder of the 2000 ms. Then, the next 14 screens showed a fluid animation of the hand pulling the curtain open and revealing the outcome
(shown here; self e2, charity e2). The feedback remained onscreen for 2300 ms. In case participants failed to respond within the timeframe of the response selection,
no animation occurred and a screen with the phrase ‘Too Late!’ was shown for 3000 ms. Outcome conditions are displayed in the table below the trial flow.
presented after the outcome presentation, marking the end of a
trial (see Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the trial flow
and the outcome conditions).
Every outcome condition occurred 15 times during the task,
resulting in a total of 105 trials. The order of trials was optimized
for our design using the program Optseq2 (Dale, 1999). The task
consisted of two blocks of 50 and 55 trials, respectively. Each
block lasted ∼6 min. At the end of the research day, participants
and charity received extra money for completing the COSY task
(both charity and the participant could earn e1–2 in steps of
e0.50, rewards were counterbalanced across participants).
Questionnaires.
COSY manipulation checks. After the fMRI session, participants
answered several questions about the COSY-task. First, to obtain
a subjective measure of the enjoyment when gaining for charity,
we asked how it felt to win different amounts of money (e0, e1,
e2 and e4) for self and charity, answering on a scale where 1
= ‘did not feel good at all’ and 7 = ‘felt very good’. Second, we
asked whether participants thought they could influence the
outcome and why they thought this was or was not the case.
We also asked participants how important they rated the charity,
and how well they knew what the charity stood for. All of these
questions were answered on seven point Likert scales. Finally,
we asked participants whether or not they normally donated
to this charity in daily life (1 =yes, 2 =no, 3 = sometimes), and
whether they thought they could influence the outcome of the
task (1 =yes, 2 =no, 3 = sometimes).
All charities were chosen at least once by the participants.
The perceived importance of chosen charities was high for all
participants (M=5.84, s.d.= 1.14), and participants reported to
have knowledge of the charity (M=4.58, s.d.= 1.36). There was
a significant correlation between perceived importance of the
charity and knowledge about the charity (r(157) = 0.35, P<0.001).
To the question whether participants donated in daily life,
85 participants answered ‘yes’ or ‘sometimes,’ and one-hundred-
and-two answered ‘no.’ Finally, to the question whether
participants believed they could influence the outcome, 10
participants answered ‘yes,’ one-hundred-and-two answered
‘no’ and 45 answered ‘sometimes.’ We checked whether individ-
ual differences in the perception of being able to influence the
outcomes during the task were associated with differences in
neural activity in the task, or to variations in donation behavior.
A set of ANOVAs showed this was not the case (all P>0.68).
Empathy and perspective taking. To investigate individual differ-
ences in empathy and perspective taking,we included the empa-
thy and perspective taking subscales of the interpersonal reac-
tivity index (IRI) questionnaire (Davis, 1980; Hawk et al., 2013).
Both subscales were reliable, with Chronbach’s alpha values of
respectively 0.72 and 0.79.
Behavioral donating task. In the exit interview after the fMRI
session, participants played a one-shot dictator game. That is,
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they were given the choice to distribute 600 valuable coins
(unbeknownst to participants, 100 coins were worth e0.50, for
a total of e3) between themselves and the charity of their choice
by selecting one of seven possible divisions on a scale (1 = 600 for
self, 0 for charity; 2 = 500 for self, 100 for charity; 3 = 400 for self,
200 for charity; 4 = 300 for self, 300 for charity; 5 = 200 for self; 400
for charity; 6 = 100 for self; 500 for charity; 7 = 0 for self and 600
for charity). In order to prevent socially desirable behavior, it was
stressed that their chosen distributionwould remain completely
anonymous.To ensure anonymity, the final amount displayed on
the screen for the experimenter was a sum of the money gained
in the fMRI task and the money divided in the one-shot dictator
game. In total, participants could earn a range of e1–5 extra for
themselves and charity, depending on their donation decisions.
MRI data acquisition. MRI data were acquired using a Philips
3.0 Tesla scanner with a standard whole-head coil attached.
For functional MRI scans, we used T2∗—weighted Echo-Planar
Imaging (TR=2.2 s, TE=30ms, FOV: 220× 220× 111.65mm,voxel
size= 2.75 × 2.75 × 2.75). Functional scans consisted of two runs
with 175 and 169 volumes, respectively. Participants were able to
see the screen through a mirror that was attached to the head
coil. The functional task lasted for ∼13 min in total. In addition
to fMRI sequences,we collected structural images for anatomical
reference (high-resolution 3D T1), TR=9.751ms,TE=4.59ms and
FOV=224 × 177 × 168 mm. Participants’ head movements were
restricted by using foam triangles to limit available space in the
coil.
MRI data analyses.
Preprocessing. We used the software package SPM8 (Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London) to preprocess and
analyze all MRI-data. For preprocessing, we first corrected all
MRI-images for motion (runs with any framewise displacement
motion higher than 3 mm were excluded), corrected them for
slice timing acquisition and consequently spatially normalized
the functional scans to T1 templates. Then, all volumes were
resampled to voxels of 3 × 3 × 3 mm. We based our templates
on the MNI305 stereotaxic space (Cocosco et al., 1997). Finally,
we used an isotropic Gaussian Kernel (6-mm FWHM) to spatially
smooth the data.
fMRI-analysis. To calculate the relevant contrasts, we modeled
the fMRI time series convolved with the hemodynamic response
function with events that corresponded to the outcome phase of
a trial. Specifically, the events of interest that we modeled were
the outcome conditions ‘self high,’ ‘self low,’ ‘charity high,’ ‘char-
ity low,’ ‘both high,’ ‘both low’ and ‘both no gain.’ These events
were time-locked with zero-duration to the exact moment that
participants were able to see the outcome; the seventh frame
of the curtain-opening animation. Trials with no response from
the participants were coded as ‘missing’ andmodeled separately
as invalid trials, and were not included in further contrasts. The
modeled events were added as regressors in a general linear
model, along with a motion regressors and a basic set of cosine
functions that high-pass filtered the data and a covariate for
session effects. The least-squares parameter estimates of height
of the best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used
in pairwise contrasts. The resulting contrast images, computed
on a subject-by-subject basis, were submitted to random-effects
group analyses. Contrast analyses for each beneficiary (self, both
and charity) relative to both no gain were performed using t-
tests. Effects of beneficiary (self, both and charity) and magni-
tude (high and low) were examined in a 3 × 2 full factorial whole
brain ANOVA in SPM. All images were thresholded by using a
false discovery rate (FDR) cluster correction (initial threshold at
P<0.001). For a visual representation of the activation in these
contrasts vs the fixation baseline, see Supplementary Figure B1
(Supplementary File B). For the time series of activation in these
contrasts after stimulus onset and feedback onset, respectively,
see Supplementary Figures C1 and C2 (Supplementary File C).
fMRI region-of-interest analysis. To investigate the effects that
emerged in after our initial whole brain analyses ANOVA,we per-
formed the region-of-interest (ROI) analyses using the Marsbar
toolbox (Brett et al., 2002).
In addition, we tested a priori hypotheses about reward-
related activity on a predefined anatomical ROI (Braams et al.,
2015) of the left and right NAcc, extracted from the Harvard–
Oxford subcortical atlas and thresholded at 40%. The mask
consists of 28 voxels for the left NAcc (center-of-mass coordi-
nates left: x=−9.57, y=11.70, z=−7.10) and of 26 voxels for the
right NAcc (coordinates right: x=9.45, y=12.60, z=−6.69). We
extracted parameter estimates for the ROI analyses. Since no sig-
nificant differences in activation were found between left NAcc
and right NAcc, all were consequently performed by collapsing
across the left and right hemispheres of the NAcc.
All reported results are available on NeuroVault (Gorgolewski
et al., 2015), see https://neurovault.org/collections/UNRMPFBJ/.
Analysis plan.
Behavioral analyses. To test whether the fMRI task was effective
in eliciting subjective reward, we investigated the behavioral
enjoyment ratings made by participants after the fMRI task. To
this end, we performed a 4 (magnitude) × 2 (beneficiary: self
or charity) repeated measures ANOVA and performed planned
comparisons to follow up the significant main within-person
effects. Next, to explore the distribution of donation behavior
and to check whether there were differences in donation behav-
ior for different charities, we respectively computed means and
standard deviations of donation behavior and conducted an
ANOVA with chosen charity as independent variable and dona-
tion as dependent variable.
Analyses of neural activation. The analyses for neural activity in
the vicarious reward task were conducted in two steps. First, we
performed whole brain analyses to test for effects of condition,
usingwhole-brain contrasts. Second,we performed ROI analyses
on the anatomical NAcc to test for the a priori hypothesized
relations with donation behavior.
Specifically, to investigate the relationships between ROI acti-
vation in NAcc and donation behavior, we conducted repeated
measures ANCOVAs in SPSS with beneficiary as factor (three
levels: self, both and charity) and, empathy, perspective taking
and donating behavior as covariates in separate analyses to
examine if patterns differed depending on variation in these
variables.
Lastly, we exploratively conducted a 3 × 2 whole-brain
ANOVA with beneficiary (three levels: self, both and charity)
and magnitude (high and low) as factors, and performed the
follow-up analyses on ROI extracted from the regions that
emerged from the whole brain analyses ANOVA (see Table 4
for coordinates) using the Marsbar Toolbox (Brett et al., 2002).
Results
Behavioral results
Enjoyment ratings. We tested whether the task was effective in
eliciting subjective reward by examining subjective enjoyment
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Fig. 2. Bar chart representing winning enjoyment for different beneficiaries andmagnitudes. Enjoyment is plotted on the y-axis (scale ranged from 1 to 7) and different
sets of bars represent different magnitudes (e0, e1, e2, e4). Blue-colored bars represent outcomes for self, red-colored bars represent outcomes for charity. Differences
significant at P < 0.05 are flagged with ‘∗’.
ratings for different magnitudes of reward (e0, e1, e2 and
e4) and for different targets (self, charity, both self and
charity). Results showed a main effect of Magnitude (F(3,
477) = 480.79, P<0.001, η2p= 0.75) and a magnitude by beneficiary
interaction (F(3, 477) = 12.99, P<0.001, η2p= 0.08) (see Figure 2).
The latter interaction showed that for both beneficiaries, higher
magnitudes were rated as more enjoyable (e4<e2<e1<e0; all
differences P<0.001). However, within-magnitude comparisons
showed that participants enjoyed it less when charity received
nothing compared to when they themselves received nothing
(F(1, 159) = 14.31, P<0.001), and enjoyed it more when, compared
to self, charity received 1 euro (F(1, 59) = 13.11,P<0.001) or 2 euros
(F(1, 159) = 11.70, P<0.001). For 4 euros, there was no differences
between beneficiaries (F(1, 59) = 1.29, P=0.26).
Behavioral donating task. Next, we addressed the question how
much participants donated in the one-shot dictator game and
how this related to individual ratings of importance, knowl-
edge about charity, perspective taking, empathy and age. Par-
ticipants donated on average 247 of the 600 coins to charity
(s.d.= 127.64). There were no significant differences in donation
amount between charities (F(9, 150) = 2.25, P=0.44, η2p = 0.057).
See Figure 3 for a histogram displaying the frequency of each
donation.
Donating behavior was negatively correlated to how much
participants reported enjoying gaining for self (average of 1, 2
and 4 euros) (r(160) =−0.364, P<0.001) and positively correlated
to how much participants reported enjoying gaining for charity
(average of 1, 2 and 4 euros) (r(160) = 0.234, P<0.001) and to
self-reported importance of the chosen charity (r(160) = 0.191,
P=0.016).
Therewas no correlation between donating behavior and age,
self-reported empathy, self-reported perspective taking or self-
reported knowledge about the chosen charity (see Table 1 for
a full overview of correlations). As can be seen in Table 1, age
was positively correlated with perspective taking (r(160) = 0.31,
P<0.001) and negatively correlated with the importance rating
of the charity (r(160) =−0.29, P<0.001). All other correlations are
also presented in Table 1.
Neural activity
Gain conditions vs no-gain. First, to test whether NAcc activity
was observed for the three beneficiary conditions, relative to
a no gain baseline (in which both beneficiaries receive e0), we
computed whole brain contrasts for each condition. As can be
seen in Figure 4, for the contrast self gain > both no gain and
both gain > both no gain, activity was observed in NAcc, but not
for charity gain> both no gain. All other activations are reported
in Table 2.
Neural activity in the NAcc and donation behavior. Next, we exam-
ined correlations between donation behavior and neural activity
in an independent anatomically defined ROI of the NAcc. We
averaged across magnitudes as there was neither main effect of
magnitude nor an interactionwithmagnitude in ourwhole brain
analyses for the NAcc (see section Exploratory analyses).
We found a negative correlation between activation in the
self gain > both no gain contrast and donation behavior (see
Table 3). More specifically, participants with relatively higher
activity in the striatum when gaining for self, donated less
to charity. Finally, to check whether activation did not differ
depending on the charity participants chose, we checked
whether neural activity in the self gain > both no gain, both
gain > both no gain and charity gain > both no gain contrasts
differed depending on the chosen charity. This was not the case
(all P>0.53).
Next, we tested if these variables showed interactions with
individual differences in repeated measures ANCOVAs with
beneficiary as factor (three levels: self, both and charity) and
empathy, perspective taking and donating behavior as respective
covariates. This resulted in two significant interactions.
For donating behavior, there was a significant beneficiary
× donating interaction, F(2, 316) = 8.42, P<0.001, η2p = 0.051.
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Fig. 3. This figure shows the absolute frequencies of prosocial donations made in the one-shot dictator game. Participants could divide 600 valuable tokens by picking
one of seven divisions.
Table 1. Correlations between self-reported empathic concern (IRI-EC), perspective taking (IRI-PT), enjoyment of self-gains and charity gains,
importance of charity, knowledge of charity, donation behavior in the donating task and age
Perspective
taking
Self-gains Charity-
gains
Importance Knowledge Donation
behavior
Age
Empathic concern 0.307∗∗∗ −0.026 0.030 0.264∗∗ 0.108 0.118 −0.103
Perspective taking −0.082 −0.041 −0.097 −0.026 0.061 0.306∗∗∗
Self-gains 0.430∗∗∗ 0.046 0.026 −0.364∗∗∗ −0.049
Charity-gains 0.271∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.234∗∗ −0.102
Importance 0.350∗∗∗ 0.191∗ −0.290∗∗∗
Knowledge 0.066 −0.084
Donation behavior 0.129
Degrees of freedom=160. Significant correlations are flagged at P < 0.05 with ‘∗’ , P < 0.01 with ‘∗∗’ and at P < 0.001 with ‘∗∗∗’ . See Supplementary Figure E1 for a version
of this table with written out P-values.
Fig. 4. From left to right: Respective activation patterns in the NAcc for self gain > both no gain, both gain > both no gain and charity gain > both no gain contrasts.
Coronal view at coordinates y =12. Activation displayed is FDR cluster corrected (initial threshold P < 0.001, accepted thresholds, respectively, 273 for self gain > both
no gain, 63 for both gain > both no gain and 173 for charity gain > both no gain).
For perspective taking, there was a significant beneficiary
× perspective taking interactions, F(2, 316) = 3.22, P=0.019,
η2p = 0.025. No interactions were found for empathy.
To further investigate these patterns, we subtracted charity
gain from self gain to obtain a difference score that reflects the
degree of similarity between the neural activity for charity and
self-gains. Note that given the zero-sum nature of the game,
charity-gains were accompanied by the absence of gains for self,
and self-gains were accompanied by the absence of gains for
charity. As a result, in this difference score, a score of 0 on this
difference score indicates identical activity for self and char-
ity, whereas negative and positive scores, respectively, reflect
a stronger striatal activation to either self-gains compared to
no-gains for charity, or charity-gains compared to no-gains for
self. We found that this difference score was significantly cor-
related to perspective taking (r=0.19, P=0.012) and donating
(r=0.279, P<0.001) (Figure 5A and B). Thus, more perspective
taking and more donating were both significantly correlated to
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Table 2. Coordinates for contrasts self gain > both no gain, charity gain > both no gain and both gain > both no gain
Contrast Region T K x y z
Self gain>both no gain Anterior cingulum 9.92 3332 0 47 7
Medial orbital gyrus 8.93 0 53 −5
Right caudate 7.71 12 14 −2
Precuneus 7.65 1905 −6 −64 37
Frontal superior medial
gyrus
6.83 0 −40 31
Left angular gyrus 6.41 −36 −67 46
Right precentral gyrus 5.28 523 18 −31 67
Right postcentral gyrus 5.12 30 −31 70
Right precentral gyrus 5.01 42 −22 58
Left paracentral lobule 4.98 273 −9 −34 70
Left precentral gyrus 4.45 −27 −25 64
Left postcentral gyrus 4.31 −36 −31 58
Char gain>both no gain Precuneus 9.18 1963 3 −58 31
Left angular gyrus 7.59 −51 −67 28
Frontal medial orbital
gyrus
7.64 1488 0 59 −2
Left frontal superior
medial gyrus
7.35 −9 65 22
Left frontal superior
gyrus
6.52 −21 29 49
Right angular gyrus 5.79 173 57 −61 28
Both gain>both no gain Cuneus 8.10 1173 −3 −64 25
Precuneus 7.32 −6 −58 16
Middle cingulum 6.19 −6 −43 37
Left occipital midline 6.36 362 −36 −73 40
Anterior cingulum 6.27 369 0 41 7
Left frontal superior gyrus 6.26 978 −21 29 46
Right caudate 5.92 9 17 −5
Left caudate/putamen 5.36 −15 11 −5
Right postcentral gyrus 6.25 746 21 −34 64
Right parietal superior
gyrus
5.41 21 −49 67
Right precentral gyrus 5.18 21 −25 73
Left frontal inferior
triangle
5.72 291 −45 29 19
Left parietal superior
gyrus
5.45 307 −21 −46 70
Paracentral lobule 4.29 0 −28 58
Left paracentral lobule 3.94 −6 −34 70
Right temporal superior
gyrus
4.88 273 60 −13 7
FDR cluster corrected (initial threshold P < 0.001), accepted FDR thresholds were 273 (self gain > both no gain), 173 (charity gain > both no gain) and 63 (both gain >
both no gain). AAL atlas was used for labeling. Subclusters that fell outside of defined regions in the AAL are not included in this table. For cluster sizes under 600
voxels, here we present only the main cluster coordinates. See https://neurovault.org/collections/UNRMPFBJ/ for the full overview of activation.
Table 3. Correlations between age, donation behavior and NAcc activation in self gain–both no gain, both gain–both no gain and charity gain–
both no gain
Donation behavior NAcc self gain NAcc both gain NAcc charity gain
Age 0.129 −0.177∗ −0.161∗ −0.044
Donation behavior −0.175∗ −0.068 0.102
NAcc self gain 0.625∗∗ 0.537∗∗
NAcc both gain 0.615∗∗
Degrees of freedom=160. Significant correlations are flagged at P <0.05 with ‘∗’ and at P < 0.001 with ‘∗∗.’ See Supplementary Figure E2 for a version of this table with
written out P-values.
more charity-vs-self-related NAcc activity. No correlations were
found for both gain–self gain.
Exploratory analyses. Lastly,we conducted awhole-brain ANOVA
to investigate the effects of beneficiary and magnitude. Results
showed a significant main effect of beneficiary with eight sig-
nificant clusters, no significant effect of magnitude and a signif-
icant beneficiary by magnitude interaction with one significant
cluster (see Table 4 for cluster coordinates). Main effects of ben-
eficiary were observed in bilateral NAcc, bilateral insula/inferior
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Fig. 5. Relations are displayed between activation in charity gain—self gain and donation behavior (A) and charity gain—self gain and perspective taking (B).
Table 4. Coordinates for the main effect of beneficiary and beneficiary by magnitude interaction for the 3× 2 ANOVA whole-brain ANOVA
Contrast Region F K x y z
Main effect beneficiary Right NAcc 24.97 145 12 11 −2
Right frontal inferior 11.40 15 2 −8
Right insula 18.68 33 20 −11
16.38 42 23 −8
Supplementary motor area 20.07 1613 12 11 61
Right supplementary motor
area
19.63 9 20 58
Left anterior cingulum 18.49 −3 38 25
Left NAcc 19.15 114 −9 8 −2
Right angular gyrus 18.59 182 60 −55 31
Right temporal midline 7.23 60 −58 16
Left frontal midline 17.43 140 −24 50 28
Left frontal superior gyrus 14.21 −27 59 22
10.22 −36 53 13
Left insula 15.47 152 −42 17 −2
Left angular gyrus 11.49 56 −57 −58 34
Right frontal midline 10.62 54 45 11 46
Interaction beneficiary
× magnitude
Anterior cingulum (mPFC) −3 47 10
14.99 429
12.26 6 47 4
11.24 9 41 16
Analyses were FDR cluster corrected (initial threshold P < 0.001), accepted thresholds 53 (main effect beneficiary) and 429 (interaction beneficiary × magnitude). AAL
atlas was used for labeling. See https://neurovault.org/collections/UNRMPFBJ/ for a full overview of activation.
frontal gyrus, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), precentral
gyrus and bilateral temporal-parietal junction (TPJ).
Visual inspection of the activation in each region and sub-
sequent post hoc testing revealed three general patterns (see
Figure 6A–C). First, the activity pattern in bilateral NAcc corre-
sponded to the amount gained for self, showing largest activity
in the self gain condition, followed by the both gain condition,
followed by the charity gain condition (Figure 6A; all P’s<0.05).
Second, bilateral insula, dACC and precentral gyrus were more
active for self gain and charity gain than both gain (with rel-
atively more activity for self gain compared to charity gain;
all P’s<0.05), potentially indicating that these regions respond
when outcomes were different from equity (Figure 6B displays
bilateral insula only; dACC and precentral gyrus showed similar
patterns). In addition, right TPJ was also more active when out-
comeswere different from equity, that is for self gain and charity
gain, with relatively more activity for charity-gains compared to
self-gains (Figure 6C; all P’s<0.05). The pattern was similar for
left TPJ, except activation for self and charity did not significantly
differ from each other.
The beneficiary × magnitude interaction resulted in a cluster
in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). To investigate these
effects in more detail, we examined this pattern in a ROI
extracted from this region. As can be seen in Figure 7, this region
was more active for low charity-gains than for high charity-
gains. In contrast, this region wasmore active for high self-gains
compared to low self-gains. No difference between magnitudes
was observed for the both conditions.
Discussion
The aims of the current study were 2-fold. First, we aimed to
test the neural responses observed in the NAcc during vicarious
gains for charity in adolescence, and compare them to self-gains
and gains for both parties. In addition, we exploratively tested
the involvement of other regions in vicarious gaining.
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Fig. 6. Displayed are the patterns of activation for the main effect of beneficiary in (A) bilateral NAcc vs the fixation baseline (y =10), (B) in bilateral insula vs the
fixation baseline (y =10) and (C) in right TPJ vs the fixation baseline (z =30). Activation was collapsed over magnitudes for the different beneficiaries. With respect to
the activation in bilateral insula (B), similar patterns were observed in dACC and precentral gyrus. Due to the zero-sum nature of the task, self gain means no gain for
charity, and charity gain means no gain for self. Activation displayed is FDR cluster corrected (initial threshold P < 0.001, accepted threshold 80). Correlates of activation
in ROIs derived from this contrast with age can be found in Supplementary File F.
Second, we examined the relations between activity in the
striatum during (vicarious) gains for self and charity, and proso-
ciality,with a specific focus on individual differences in empathy,
perspective taking, self-reported enjoyment, relationship with
the charity and donation behavior.
Neural correlates of gaining for self and charity
NAcc. First, we investigated whether NAcc activity was depen-
dent on whether gains were experienced for self or charity.
Consistent with prior studies comparing self- vs other-gains
(Montague and Berns, 2002; Delgado, 2007; Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2015), the NAcc was more active when participants
gained money for themselves (at the expense of charity).
Interestingly, we found increased activity in the NAcc when
gains were obtained for both self and charity (both gain
condition), but not when gains were for charity only (at the
expense of self).
This supports the notion that the NAcc reflects the valuation
of uniquely self-relevant outcomes. That is, monetary outcomes
for self were on average highest in the self conditions (for a
mean self-gain of e3.00), followed by the both conditions (for
a mean self-gain of e1.50), followed by the charity conditions
(for a mean self-gain of e0.00). As such, the most parsimonious
explanation would be that responses in the NAcc covaried with
the absolute outcomes for self, regardless of gains for charity
(Morelli et al., 2015).
Surprisingly, we found no significant whole brain effect of
magnitude in the NAcc. Given the role of the NAcc in subjective
valuation, we would have expected activation in this region to
covary with increases in gain-amount. Possibly, since activation
wasmost pronounced in the self conditions, having the both and
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charity conditions included in this whole brain analysis washes
out the main effect of magnitude. The magnitude × target anal-
yses did result in significant activation in mPFC, supporting the
notion that participants did differentiate between magnitudes
in the task.
Medial prefrontal cortex. The mPFC, a brain region often co-
activated with the NAcc in reward processing (Van
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2016) and associated with self-relevant
processing (Denny et al., 2012), showed a significant beneficiary
by magnitude interaction. Specifically, mPFC showed increased
activation relative to all other conditions when gaining high
magnitudes for self and when gaining low magnitudes for
charity. Possibly, the mPFC tracks subjective significance of
outcomes (Schmitz and Johnson, 2007).Gaining highmagnitudes
for self may be highly salient for participants, whereas low
rather than high charity outcomes may be experienced as most
subjectively salient given that the relative loss for self is low,
while at the same time this could be considered a prosocial
outcome. These findings fit with the subjective behavior ratings
for which participants indicated that they enjoyed gaining 2
euros slightly more for charity than for self. Future studies
should follow up these results, but possibly themPFC is involved
in monitoring the value of rewards received by oneself vs others
(Dal Monte et al., 2018).
Temporal-parietal junction. The right TPJ showed higher activa-
tion in self- and charity-conditions compared to both-conditions
and was more active for charity than self. Activation in TPJ
has often been related to perspective taking abilities (Blakemore
and Mills, 2014) or switching between perspectives of self and
others (Carter and Huettel, 2013; Schurz et al., 2014). A recent
study found that TPJ recruitment was higher when adolescents
passively viewed prosocial scenes compared to social and non-
interactive scenes (Tashjian et al., 2018). These findings align
with the finding of stronger TPJ recruitment for charitable giving.
Future studies should examine the specificity of TPJ for prosocial
motivations.
The activity in mPFC and TPJ is in line with previous research
on the roles of these regions in mentalizing about others’
thoughts and intentions (Frith and Frith, 2003; Burnett et al.,2009;
Van Overwalle, 2009), and with studies that show that activity in
mPFC is related to the subjective valuation of donations (Hare
et al., 2010; Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014).
Salience network. A separate network of brain regions seemed
specifically sensitive to gains that benefited one target, relative
to gains for both parties. Specifically, the bilateral insula, dACC
and the precentral gyrus showedhighest activation for outcomes
for self only, followed by charity only, with least activation in the
condition which benefited both. These regions are all part of the
salience network (Seeley et al., 2007; Sridharan et al., 2008; Menon
and Uddin, 2010), and have been found to be active for highly
self-relevant, salient information (Perini et al.,2018).One possible
interpretation for higher saliency in these conditions is that they
include higher absolute pay-off amounts per target (e2 ande4 vs
e1 ande2 euro’s), and as suchmight have drawnmore attention.
Moreover, prior studies have also shown that deviation from the
equity norm (an equal allocation between targets) is experienced
as a salient event, and is associated with increased activation in
dACC and insula (Gürog˘lu et al., 2014).
Gaining for self and charity and prosociality
The second goal of this study was to relate vicarious reward
responses in a false choice paradigm, where outcomes were
controlled, to actual prosociality in terms of behavior and self-
reports. Here,we found that activity in the striatum for vicarious
charity-gains was related to individual differences in donation
behavior, self-reported enjoyment and perspective taking.
Interestingly, donation behavior outside theMRI scanner was
related to the difference in activity found for charity- and self-
gains during the fMRI task. Increased activity for charity-gains
compared to self-gains was related to higher donations.. How-
ever, given the zero-sum nature of the current paradigm (where
gains for self imply less gains for charity), it should be noted that
interpretations about personal rewards are unequivocally linked
to the absence of vicarious rewards, and vice versa.
These findings on the relationship between activation during
vicarious gaining and donation behavior are consistent with
prior research in adults, which reported that vicarious activity
in the NAcc for gains for friends was associated with real life
prosociality (Morelli et al., 2018). Here, we observed similar find-
ings for self-reported enjoyment for self- and charity-gains. That
is, we found that the self-reported enjoyment of the respective
gains for self and charity was significantly related to donation
behavior. Together, these findings show that activity in the stria-
tum during vicarious gaining reflects the valuation of prosocial
outcomes, and that it relates to tendencies to perform proso-
cial behavior (Moll et al., 2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Genevsky
et al., 2013). Additionally, the current findings show that perspec-
tive taking may be an important factor that underlies vicarious
reward responses to charity, as individuals who scored higher on
perspective taking also showed stronger reward-related activity
in the NAcc when vicariously gaining for charity.
Given that adolescence might be a period in which individ-
ual differences in prosociality emerge, an interesting question
concerns whether or not prosociality of adolescents is prone to
change as a result of interventions or community programs. A
meta-analysis on community service programs demonstrated
that positive effects of community service on prosocial values
were dependent on whether the program involved reflection
(Van Goethem et al., 2014). Given that community programs with
reflection elements can affect prosocial values, an interesting
question for future research is whether fostering these val-
ues may also lead individuals to experience stronger vicarious
reward for unknown others.
Finally, there were some unexpected findings in the current
study that should be addressed in future research. In self-report,
participants indicated that they enjoyed gaining for charitymore
than gaining for themselves. They also reported that they pre-
ferred losses for themselves over losses for charity. However,
if striatal activity reflects processes related to the valuation of
an outcome, one would expect the self-reported enjoyment for
charity-gains to be correlated to the striatal activity for charity-
gains, which was not the case in the current study. Perhaps, self-
reported enjoyment is more subjected to social desirability bias
than the neural activity. Participants may be prone to overstate
their reported subjective enjoyment for charity-gains, as being
charitable is a socially desirable characteristic. Related to this,
the propensity to be sensitive to demand characteristics could
explain the unexpectedly high enjoyment ratings for charity-
gains. Possibly, participants might have felt that answering in a
prosocial way (by reporting high charity-gain enjoyment or even
by donating high amounts of tokens in the one-shot dictator
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Fig. 7. The target × magnitude interaction in mPFC is displayed in the figure (x =0). Different bars display activation for different targets. Blue bars represent low-
magnitude gains, whereas red bars represent high-magnitude gains. Due to the zero-sum nature of the task, self gain mean no gain for charity and charity gain mean
no gain for self. Activation displayed is FDR cluster corrected (initial threshold P <0.001, accepted threshold 429).
game) was appropriate or expected of them.We tried to limit the
role of possible demand effects by stressing that there were no
right or wrong answers, bymasking the outcome of the one-shot
dictator game, by having several different experimenters, and
by refraining from communicating the purpose of this part of
the study. However, latent demand propensities cannot be ruled
out as a possible confound with the current paradigm. Possibly,
similar processes (e.g. implicit social norms) could play a role
in daily life donating as well (Martin and Randal, 2008). Finally,
reporting how you feel about winning afterwards and online
neural activation during the task could reflect complementary
processes of valuation. These seemingly contradicting findings
warrant further investigation.
Limitations and future directions
The current study had some limitations that should be
addressed in the future research. First, the design made use
of a false-choice paradigm to control the number of gain events.
This, however, limited the possibility to relate the neural activity
to actual task choice. Future studies should therefore extend
these findings by also including choice paradigms (Moll et al.,
2006; Harbaugh et al., 2007; Genevsky et al., 2013). Second,
since we measured importance to a charitable organization
rather than actual relationship closeness, direct comparisons
against previous studies that did gauge relationship closeness
in vicarious gaining paradigms should be interpreted with
caution. Possibly, importance of a charity is related differently
to individual differences in valuation of vicarious gains
than relationship closeness to a stranger, friend or family
member. Finally, the current study was cross-sectional, whereas
developmental relations, such as between perspective taking,
prosocial valuing and giving behavior in adolescence, can best
be studied using longitudinal designs (Taris, 2000; Telzer et al.,
2018).
Conclusions
Taken together, the current study confirmed that in adolescence
vicarious reward activity in the NAcc when gaining for charity
is significantly related to subsequent prosocial behavior. This
neural signal may be an important marker for the valuation
of prosocial outcomes (see also Morelli et al., 2018). Finally, we
observed several separable activation patterns in social brain
regions. Whereas TPJ was more strongly activated when gains
deviated from the equity norm in favor of charity, insula and
dACC were more strongly activated when gains deviated from
the equity norm in favor of self. Together, the current results
help to unravel individual sensitivities towards gaining for self
and others.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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